I n Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown, Virginia Woolf famously (and audaciously) declared that "in or about December 1910 human character changed" (4). Let me take my lead from Woolf here and open this introduction by suggestingplayfully and yet with a certain audacity of my ownthat "in or about January 2018" the way we think about a longstanding cultural ideal of human subjectivity may have changed. As was the case for Woolf, this change "was not sudden and definite"; however, something about the way we conceive of ourselves and our relations to others may have shifted, and, as Woolf says, "since one must be arbitrary, let us date it about the year 1910" (4)or rather, in my case, the year 2018.
What leads me to this suggestion is the accumulation of a number of small cultural shiftsin themselves perhaps not all that remarkable, yet collectively acquiring a kind of weight or momentumthat speak (if we are willing to listen) of a transformed way of thinking about ourselves and the appeal that the Enlightenment legacy of the solitary, autonomous individual has held for us since its inception. Arguably most prominent and notable among these developments is Theresa May's appointment of Tracey Crouch as the world's first Minister for Loneliness on 17 January 2018. While Europeans may have mocked Britain and suggested that the country's decision to leave the European Union would "result in an isolated, lonely island nation" (Yeginsu)and the apparent impossibility of securing an acceptable Brexit deal is intriguing to consider in this light -Britain's pervasive problems with loneliness, such as they are evidenced by this appointment, are clearly not a laughing matter, for the detrimental impact of loneliness on both mental and physical health is increasingly well documented. 1 What this appointment signals, therefore, is an official recognition of the systemic problem with isolation and disconnection that contemporary Britain has (and shares with large parts of the 3 A N G E L A K I journal of the theoretical humanities volume 24 number 3 june 2019
Western world), 2 and that requires thoughtful and effective interventionfrom the highest level, if need be. Moreover, what it opens up for us is the possibility of recognising that solitary and independent existence, so long held dear to us and even celebrated as an ideal in the Western tradition, may harbour a much less desirable flipside; in fact, we might come to suspect that the celebrated figure of the autonomous individual may, at heart, be quite a lonely creature.
As a second indicator that change could be underfoot in the way we think about ourselves and our relations to others, we might cite the publication of Johann Hari's Lost Connections: Uncovering the Real Causes of Depression and their Unexpected Solutions 3 just a few days earlier. Endorsed by numerous celebrities -Emma Thompson, Elton John and Hillary Clinton prominently among themthis book quickly shot up the best-seller lists and captured the public imagination with its central claim that anxiety/depression "wasn't just a problem caused by the brain going wrong. It was caused by life going wrong" (53). Challenging the hegemonic bio-medical model assuring us that depression was caused by insufficient serotonin levels in the brainand could easily be fixed with the right medication -Hari looked more closely into what he calls the "Depression and Anxiety Underground" (59): the largely ignored social and psychological causes of depression and anxiety. And what he found there was that the various causes identified by psychologists and social scientists have a common denominator: "They are all forms of disconnection. They are all ways in which we have been cut off from something we innately need but seem to have lost along the way" (ibid.). Depression and anxiety, that is to say, are no longer simply an individual's problem (and an individual's responsibility) but rather a problem of the "connective tissue" between individuals: we are becoming anxious and depressed at unprecedented levels not (or not only) because we lack certain neurotransmitters but because we have become creatures of disconnectionan insight which should, if we have any sense, steer us away from any further investment in ideals of autonomous individuality and redirect us towards fostering connection with others instead.
Third and finally in this "arbitrary" little narrative, let me mention the publication, a few months later, of an academic text proclaiming these and other phenomena to be evidence of what the editorial team, made up of Niobe Way, Alisha Ali, Carol Gilligan, and Pedro Noguera, declare to be a large-scale "crisis of connection":
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, we are beset by a crisis of connection. People are increasingly disconnected from themselves and each other, with a state of alienation, isolation, and fragmentation characterizing much of the modern world. (1) While acknowledging that "the concept of a crisis of connection is not yet widely utilized," Way et al. claim that "signs of its existence are everywhere" (ibid.). I cite their full account:
The decreasing levels of empathy and trust, and the rising indices of depression, anxiety, loneliness, and social isolation indicate a loss of connection at the individual and community levels. The impact of such a crisis is evident in the rising rates of suicide, drug addiction, and mass violence, and the high rates of incarceration, hate crimes, domestic violence, and sexual assault on college campuses, as well as astronomical inequality in income, education, health care, and housing. The crisis is, furthermore, reflected in our competition for basic human needssafety, good schools, housing, nutrition, clean water, and health careand in our tendency to treat social problems as individual or group-specific rather than collective concerns. (Ibid.)
What we see here, quite clearly, is that both the Ministry of Loneliness and Hari's Lost Connections are symptoms of a broader crisis, one in which an individual's lived relations with others are affected as much as their self-experience. Cherished solitudeonce idealised as an integral part of free and autonomous existence morphs into isolation and loneliness, just like empathy and trust give way to indifference (at best) or violence (at worst). With regard to editorial introduction the latter, Way et al. point out, for example, that "Hate crimes against Muslims have increased dramatically in Christian-dominated countries since 9/11" (34), and that "incidents of mass violence, defined as violence that kills at least four people, occurred in the United States in 2015 at the rate of approximately one per day" (35). Moreover, they insist that these two aspectsa miserably reduced self-experience and violent other-relatednessinform each other, suggesting that "Evidence that such violence is linked to a crisis of connection is found in the data that show that perpetrators of these crimes are almost always described as lonely and isolated" (ibid.).
While I have some reservations about the ways in which the editors scope out their project, 4 I am in overall agreement with their claim for "the need for a paradigm shift" which "recognizes interdependence as the human condition" (43), and which therefore understands ruptures to this interdependence as problematic aberrations. In other words, I agree that the "crisis of connection" presents as a crisis, or a problem, precisely because "humans are inherently responsive and relational beings" and "not simply the rugged, aggressive, and competitive individuals that we are often made out to be" (3). What is implicit in this diagnosis of a "crisis of connection" is thus the underlying recognition of the fundamental importance of our relational existence. To be sure, the "paradigm shift" Way et al. call for has been underwayat least in scholarly discussionsfor quite some time: "critiques of the self-determining autonomous subject that were so explosive and contentiously debated just a few decades ago have become virtually commonplace," Nancy Yousef suggested as far back as 2004 (6). Way et al.'s reminder that "humans are inherently responsive and relational beings" is therefore not an altogether new insight but rather the product of a minor, but fairly well-established, line of thought within the Western tradition which has run counter to, and challenged, the dominant Enlightenment legacy of autonomous individuality. Whether it is the feminist "ethics of care" tradition of the 1970s, the relational transformation of psychoanalysis during the 1980s, or, indeed, Andrew Benjamin's recent suggestion that, within the context of Western philosophy, "relationality has always been there […] as philosophy's other possibility" (2), a "relational turn" has swept through numerous disciplines over the last few decades. This "turn," at its most fundamental, is informed by the broad recognition that, as humans, we are not, as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz would have it, monads with "no windows through which anything could enter them or depart from them" , but rather inherently relational creatures who come into existence in relation to others and who continue to need each other throughout our lives.
More recently, and in ways that are fundamentally informed by the growing impact that the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas has had on humanities discourse over the last few decades, this understanding of ourselves as relational beings has become directly associated with our ethical capacity. Judith Butler's work is exemplary here in advancing such an understanding of ourselves as ethical qua relationalmost explicitly, perhaps, when she speaks of a "convergence between the ethical scene in which my life is, from the start, bound up with others and the psychoanalytic scene that establishes the intersubjective conditions of my own emergence, individuation, and survivability" (Giving an Account 59). Indeed, all of her key texts published in the first decade of this millennium -Precarious Life (2004), Giving an Account of Oneself (2005), and Frames of War (2009)emphasise the ways in which our relational entanglements with others lie at the heart of our capacity for ethical responsibility: "ethics," she argues in her recent exchange with Athena Athanasiou, "is always a question of an ethical relation" (107). She explains:
So when I am called upon to care for another, or, indeed, to resist a social condition of inequality, or to oppose an illegitimate war or devastating occupation, it is not a matter of finding my bearings in my drichel personal morality or my individual disposition. Rather, it is precisely because I am from the start implicated in the lives of the other that the "I" is already social, and must begin its reflection and action from the presumption of a constitutive sociality. (Ibid.)
Butler and Athanasiou go so far as to call this fundamental relationality a form of "dispossession," a term that, they say, at least in one sense, "marks the limits of self-sufficiency and that establishes us as relational and interdependent beings" (3). In fact, such dispossession, for them, "stands as a heteronomic condition for autonomy, or, perhaps more accurately, as a limit to the autonomous and impermeable self-sufficiency of the liberal subject through its injurious yet enabling fundamental dependency and relationality" (2; emphasis added). What is important here is precisely that this form of relational dispossession is conceived of as a fundamentally enabling condition 5against the foil of which forms of liberal (and neoliberal) antirelationality, such as they are associated with the autonomous and self-sufficient subject bequeathed to us by Enlightenment thought, can only emerge as forms of limitation or deprivation. Because we come into being with and for the other, we are ethically implicated in the lives of others in ways from which we cannot easily extricate ourselvesor if we do, in our emulations of the "autonomous and impermeable self-sufficiency of the liberal subject," then we end up simultaneously harming ourselves, as the relational creatures that we are. Which is to say, we cannot extricate ourselves without simultaneously plunging into a "crisis of connection."
What is intriguing to me is that this "relationality scholarship" seems to have made very little impact on the popular imagination, which continues to be dominated by idealisations (and illusions) of freedom, independence, and autonomy, especially in our anxious neoliberal times. Given how powerfully persuasive, even irrefutable, the primacy of relationality isat least with regard to subject constitution 6the ways in which we nonetheless try to refute this primacy and assert ourselves as independent and autonomous beings, that is, as beings free from the tangles of relationality, is, indeed, striking. So when I speak of "January 2018" as a cultural moment when the way we think about a cultural ideal may have changed or when, at the very least, we are given the opportunity to reconsider this cultural ideal, what I have in mind is that the "crisis of connection" may serve as a reminder of the primacy of relationalityprecisely because the absence or disappearance of it from our lives puts us into crisis: we become lonely, depressed, and ethically immune to the suffering of others (if not outright violent). In fact, Way et al. argue that, "In the place of the 'we,' we have been left with the 'me,' the solitary individual, whose needs, wants, and desires take precedence over the collective" (1); in other words, the crisis of connection sees us being confronted with an inverted version of the old cultural ideal of autonomous individuality. No longer happily free of entanglements with others but suffering from a distinct lack or fragility of these entanglements, we meet, in the contemporary "solitary individual," the Enlightenment subject's sadder cousin. The "crisis of connection," that is to say, brings us face to face with "the other possibility" inherent in glorifications of solitary and autonomous existence: the possibility that the very thing we desire and strive for turns out to be not very good for usa splendid example of what Lauren Berlant calls "cruel optimism," a relation which exists, she says, "when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing (1). Making a case for the intimate link between connection and well-being, Cacioppo and Patrick emphasise that "human beings do not thrive as the 'existential cowboys' that so much of modern thought celebrates," adding:
While it may be literally true that "we are born alone" and that "we die alone," connection not only helped make us who we are in evolutionary terms, it helps determine who we become as individuals. In both cases, human connections, mental health, physiological health, and emotional well-being are all inextricably linked. (131)
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Never really having left the popular imagination as a cultural ideal to be striven for, this figurethe rugged autonomous individual or "existential cowboy"now emerges not so much as a figure of happy solitary existence and freedom, or even just of the kind of ethical indifference and/or violence to which relationality scholars have alerted us, but also of abject and miserable loneliness. And it is in this sense, I think, that "January 2018" offers us a significant opportunity to reconsider the kinds of cultural ideals we strive foran opportunity which might give us the tools to drag ourselves out of this crisis. The stakes could not be higher: our own well-being and survival is at stake, as is the well-being and survival of those to whose ethical demands we close our hearts and minds, eyes and ears, and whom we thereby refuse an ethical response.
What is particularly interesting to me here is the question of why, from a psychoanalytic perspective, we cling to this figure of isolation so much. Analogously, why is the isolationist rhetoric of closing borders and building wallsto name but one prominent example of currently active anti-relational strivingsso compelling in the contemporary political landscape? If, as Cacioppo and Patrick (and many others) suggest, connection makes us who we are and ensures our health and well-being, why are we so wedded to fantasies of solitary and autonomous existence thatas we appear to be finding out nowmay well be haunted by lonely and deprived undercurrents? This question strikes me as important because, if violence and loneliness are indeed linked in a "crisis of connection"in ways that remain to be more closely analyseddetermining quite why the figure that emblematises such a crisis continues to appeal to us is exactly what may offer us a way out of this crisis. In other words, if we can come to understand why the fantasy of independent and self-sufficient existence retains such power over our imaginations, we might be able to see what need in us it is responding toand thereby come to find the means to end the investment in a fantasy that, in itself, may not be the (sole) cause of such a crisis, but that certainly cements us ever more solidly into it.
What I am raising here, in my own (perhaps somewhat circuitous) way, is thus a version of the question which animates Butler and Athanasiou's discussion in Dispossession: "What makes political responsiveness possible?" (xi). They write that "dispossession is constituted as a form of responsiveness that gives rise to action and resistance, to appearing together with others, in an effort to demand the end of injustice" (ibid.). The question that therefore emerges for them is "how to become dispossessed of the sovereign self" so that such forms of responsiveness become possible (ibid.). My own questionrelated to theirs but somewhat differently accentedis what sees us resist this act of dispossession and cling to "the sovereign self" that gets in the way of such responsiveness? 7 It is a question, ultimately, about the kinds of obstacles that might sidetrack or derail an originary sociality or "dispossessed" subjectivityand the ethical potential that is attached to itand reroute it into fantasies of "autonomous and impermeable self-sufficiency" (2). It is a question, then, about what it may be that puts the ethical force of relationality at risk or even extinguishes it altogethera question it seems crucial to raise in the context of a special issue on "Relationality" where, as I will detail below, the majority of contributors implicitly or explicitly make an argument for precisely such an ethical force of relationality.
My hope here is that, if we can build on the cultural moment that I have called "January 2018" and draw greater attention not just to the ethical violence inherent in the fantasy of an autonomous subject immune to the demands of exteriority, 8 but also, and specifically, to the loneliness and deprivation that may inhabit this ideal in ways that have remained largely invisible and that feed our ongoing, cruelly optimistic, investment in this fantasy, we may be able to gain added leverage for dislodging the fantasy and with it its ethical violence: a violence that sees us build walls, close borders or even commit (mass) murder. In other words, and to put it crudely, if we can come to see more clearly that in our single-minded autonomous strivingsour drichel efforts to be free of the otherwe are hurting not just the other but also ourselves and that it is therefore in our own best interest to find ways of welcoming in the kind of "dispossession" of which Butler and Athanasiou speak, we might be able to let go of the injurious fantasy of monadic existence more readily than, it appears, we have thus far been able to. Perverse as this may be, perhaps self-interest is ultimately what it takes to bring about ethical change. "January 2018," in this context, may well be taken as the cultural moment that enables the reconfiguration of an old and damaging fantasy: the moment when the conventional story of Western liberal subjectivity and its figureheadthe solitary, autonomous individualis retold as the narrative of a fundamental "crisis of connection."
The contributions assembled in this special issue on "Relationality" certainly advance such a retelling. Opening the issue, Rosalyn Diprose's essay "Relationality and the Photographic Image: Of Sovereignty, Singularity, or Loneliness?" brings the juxtaposition of relationality and loneliness I have thematised here to our attention (albeit in a markedly different way) when she argues that the loss of relationality abandons others to what Hannah Arendt calls "utter loneliness." Such loneliness signals the loss of ethical relationality: we refuse to be compelled by the plight of others and thereby deprive them of political community. In her effort to understand what might facilitate or, conversely, counteract such refusal, Diprose focuses on the power of images, asking, why do some images of people in dire straits (refugees, victims of war or famine, and so on)still photographs in particularinspire the widespread opening of hospitable relations, while other images of people in a similar predicament provoke the closure of relations, of national borders, of hearts, and of minds?
The answer she arrives at, after a discussion of Kant's rationalist account of the sublime experience and Barthes's materialist account of press photography, mobilises Maurice Merleau-Ponty's and Jean-Luc Nancy's relational ontology, which posits relationality in terms of a corporeal, affective "sharing of singularity." Her central claim is that the potency and impact of the image can be explained if we allow that the same ontology of relationality is at play in both the spectator's "perception" of the image and the agency of the persons caught up in the events that the photograph portrays.
More particularly, the reason why some (and only some) images affect us and elicit ethical responsiveness and political action is to do with the paradoxical way an image may depict figures deprived of their capacity for shared meaning-making, while the image itself continues to gesture towards such shared meaning-making in the very act of affecting us, thereby impelling usin a quasi-performative gestureto re-establish the relationality that the image depicts as having been lost. As she argues, if the photograph moves me, not only am I thereby implicated in the (political) conditions underlying the loss of relationality that the photograph depicts, but also the image affirms sense by giving itself to the possibility of meaning (Nancy, The Ground 10-11).
The next set of articlesby Neil Vallelly, Josephine Carter, Matthew Calarco, and Robert Bernasconiextend the ethical frame introduced by Diprose by turning to the work of Emmanuel Levinas for their respective analyses. Complementing Diprose's article both in its phenomenological methodology and interest in questions of relationality and its loss or disappearance, Neil Vallelly's "The Relationality of Disappearance" inverts the direction of enquiry, focusing not so much on the loss of the other's relationality (Arendt's "utter loneliness") but rather on the effects of the loss of relationality on the "I": "what happens to the 'I' when the other disappears"? Making a distinction between ontic and ontological relationality, Vallelly argues that the loss of an ontic relationalitythe tie with a particular othernot only leaves the "I" irrevocably changed editorial introduction but also functions as a reminder of our fundamental ontological relationality. As such, loss always offers potential, namely the "opportunity to re-think habituated and potentially damaging forms of relationality." It is precisely because "there is a lingering relationality in disappearance" that the disappearance of others is intimately intertwined with ethical responsibility: it is the loss that reminds us of our relational entanglements with, and responsibility to, others. The risk, however, a risk particularly pronounced in our neoliberal era, is that the fear of such loss sees us retreat into fantasies of anti-relational invulnerability which end up "re-disappearing" the other by refusing the transformative potential that disappearance holdsa refusal that implies "that the disappearance of the other has not registered in any lasting form and therefore does not matter." Moreover, drawing on Judith Butler's work on grievability, he contends that when we wilfully "disappear" people, we refuse them the capacity to have their disappearance register as a disappearance that matterswe refuse to see their "face," their ethical forceand that, therefore, "For a transformative relationality to emerge, we must re-find the face of the other." Looking at cases of forced disappearancespecifically, the many thousands who were "disappeared" during Argentina's "Dirty War"he proposes that the actions of the mothers of the disappeared constitute such a re-finding: "In refusing to let the faces of their children disappear, these mothers refuse to allow their children to be ethically murdered." In other words, through refusing to let their children be re-disappeared, they challenge us to come face to face with the "relationality of disappearance": the presence of an ontological relationality we cannot, ultimately, disavow.
The third article, Josephine Carter's "Reading the Dead with W.G. Sebald: Relational Challenges to Neoliberalism," continues the conversation with both neoliberalism and disappearance that Vallelly opened upif this time more specifically via reflections on the haunting effects of the disappearance of the dead. The premise of her paper is that in a neoliberal regime where everything must be measurable and calculable, the humanities are having a hard time accounting for why they still have value. Problematically, she suggests, even one of their core offeringsethicshas become co-opted by neoliberalism. The way forward, she therefore proposes, "rests in closely scrutinising the pivotal concepts that underpin neoliberal ethics: the autonomous subject and the model of self-sustaining time that substantiates this persistent fiction." What she means here is that neoliberalism privileges a sense of responsibility that is grounded in assumptions of autonomy (and thus culpability) and that struggles to address historical grievances precisely because they so often transcend a direct line of culpability. She therefore concludes that "neoliberalism's foundations are premised on anti-relationality" and seeks to mobilise Levinas's relational ethicssupplemented by Jean Laplanche's account of how enigmatic signifiers become part of our psyches in a way that clearly designates us as creatures of "afterwardness" (Laplanche's translation of Freud's Nachtraglickeit)as a means to prise open neoliberal assumptions of what it means to be responsible. Introducing W.G. Sebald's The Emigrants as a case study, she proposes that the text "invites two possible forms of ethical interpretation," with the first falling into line with neoliberal assumptions about individual responsibility, and the secondinformed by Sebald's haunting line, "so they are ever returning to us, the dead"resonating more closely with the "strange temporality" of afterwardness she has introduced. In this second line of interpretation, Sebald's narratoras a creature of afterwardnessreveals his relational indebtedness to the dead in a way that sees him being haunted by a sense of failed or impossible responsibility: "Constantly negotiating the enigmatic signifiers through which the dead return, Sebald's narrator experiences an uncanny sense of always being too late and speaks as a site of relational indebtedness." What is important here is that being haunted by such a sense of "being too late" for our appointments with the dead might, in fact, reawaken our responsibility to the livinga suggestion that resonates strongly with Vallelly's argument that the loss drichel of an ontic relationality serves as a reminder of our inescapable ontological relationality. Carter concludes:
However, sometimes, as Sebald's entire oeuvre testifies, our encounters with the dead can reawaken the self's relational constitution. As if woken from a slumber, we are offered the opportunity to engage with our world anew, and we become the creature our era so desperately needs: a creature who is indebted to, attuned to, and responsible for the living.
Staying with Levinas, the fourth article, Matthew Calarco's "All Our Relations: Levinas, the Posthuman, and the More-than-Human," expands the ethical purview offered thus far by finding in Levinas's writings on humanism perhaps "surprising resources for thinking about ethics and relationality beyond human beings," thereby rendering them productive "for a posthuman and more-thanhuman age." Calarco begins with an acknowledgement that "In our increasingly posthuman age, Emmanuel Levinas's call for a 'humanisme de l'autre homme' will undoubtedly appear unfashionable to many readers." He argues, however, that Levinas's writings on humanism in fact reveal "some surprising ways in which his thinking actually anticipates and provides essential resources for working through some of the deepest intellectual and practical challenges associated with posthumanism"particularly in the "important account" they offer of "the relationality that makes posthuman relations possible." Like Carter, Calarco therefore emphasises the degree to which Levinas's humanism breaks with "the problematic atomism and uncritical individualism of the humanism dominant in the Western philosophical tradition" and offers us a "fundamentally relational account of human existence" instead. Situating his discussion in a helpful overview of the humanism/antihumanism debates of the 1960s, Calarco proposes that Levinas's humanism retains many of the decentring impulses that characterised the antihumanist challenges to humanism. However, while certainly emphasising the "radically relational nature of the human," Levinas, Calarco argues, tempers this antihumanist relationality with an insistence on human singularitythe absolute uniqueness of each human beingand therefore assumes a "more profound notion of relationality" than that which underpins antihumanism. Moreover, his humanism is deeply informed by an insistence on distinguishing "the human, which is to say the miracle of the ethical relation," from human nature, the simple self-interested persistence in being that human animals share with other animals. It is, of course, precisely such an uncritical mobilisation of an anthropological difference that has rendered Levinas's account problematic to a good many of his contemporary readers; however, as Calarco argues, in defence of Levinas, such a mobilisation is the "unthought limit not just of Levinas's mature discourse but also of much of the contemporary theoretical scene, posthumanist or otherwise." Rather than simply dismissing Levinas on those grounds, we should perhaps instead "pursue the opening that Levinas's work provides for us," an opening that "allows us to think and be transformed by a relation with radical alterity" and that therefore ultimately undoes any sense of human propriety (and, with it, anthropological difference). In his concluding section, Calarco turns to an early essay of Levinas's, "The Meaning of Religious Practice," which introduces a mode of thinking about religious ritual as a form of meditation that "aims at a disruption of our unreflective attitudes, habits, and dispositions so that other relations might obtain." By rendering the familiar world strange, rituals return to the world its fundamental alterity, thereby enabling the reconstitution of "all our relations," not just the relation with the human other, as his later work suggests.
The essay to conclude this very Levinasian section of the special issue, Robert Bernasconi's "The Other Does Not Respond: Levinas's Answer to Blanchot," complicates the by now familiar anchoring of an ethical dimension in the idea of relationality via the work of Levinaswith Butler, as I suggested above, being the most prominent name to be associated editorial introduction with this trajectory in relationality scholarshipby reminding us of Levinas's curious insistence that the relation between the I and the other is a "relation without relation." In other words, relationality is not at all as straightforward an idea in Levinas's work as recent conversations on "ethical relationality" may have suggested. Bernasconi opens his essay with a set of penetrating questions:
Can I still say I? Can I? Should I? Didn't I just say I? […] Is the capacity to say I a condition of relationality, in which case it might seem that one term of the relation is already established in advance? But would that not amount to a denial of the priority of relationality? […] Or is it possible that relationality does not link two or more pre-existing individuals, but that in relationality the relation is in some sense prior to the relata?
What these questions get at is the difficulty of how to think the dynamic between the "I" and relationality: does the "I" exist independently of relationalityindeed, is a condition of relationalityor, conversely, does the "I" only come into existence as a product of relationality? As we have seen, Butler's influence has ensured that Levinas is usually taken to uphold the second position, but what Bernasconi shows us, in an astute and probably long-overdue close reading of Levinas's oeuvre on the question of relationality, is that Levinas is actually much more ambivalent than that. Thus Bernasconi tells us that, while there are certainly many resources in his work that support the idea of "the primacy of relationality" or "a fundamental relationality," there are plenty of other passages that speak of "Levinas's resistance to the idea of a priority of the relation over the terms of the relation" and that, in fact, point to his "precarious balancing act between relationality and absolution from relations." This balancing act finds expression in attempts to articulate a "structure by which a self-sacrifice without self-renunciation becomes possible": the self must be for-the-other and yet cannot disappear, or be renunciated, without risking the loss of responsibility. What this means is that "Neither the terms of the relation nor relationality is given priority"to the point that "Levinas, it seems, cannot say the word relation without trying to unsay it: a relation and a non-relation." In the second half of the essay, Bernasconi turns to Levinas's exchange with Blanchot, who presses Levinas on the curious form of subjectivityan "I that must be spoken but of which we cannot say what it is because it lacks consistency"that he pursues in his work. Insisting that the kind of responsibility of which Levinas speaks "cannot be called mine, precisely because it comes from the other," Blanchot offered, as his own alternative, the idea of a "subjectivity without a subject"a suggestion that Levinas rejects, never wanting to go as far as relinquishing the "I." Bernasconi concludes his essay with a detailed discussion of the role that religion, as an "intrigue," plays in this paradoxical structure of relation/non-relation that Levinas seeks to articulate, suggesting that "elucidating the structure of religion as an intrigue presents it neither as fundamental to nor as derivative of the encounter between an I and an other." In other words, Levinas "wanted it both ways." It is in this sense, then, that we can say that responsibility comes from the Other but stays mine and mine alone. Bernasconi therefore concludes:
the Other breaks my self-identification and complacency as an existent being in the world and takes me out of my self. But because this happens in the ethical intrigue, it brings me back to my self in the sense that the responsibility is mine. Although self-renunciation and self-assertion sound like opposites, they are intimately connected.
The essays that make up the second half of the special issue step away from some of these more abstract reflections on relationality and consider the functioning of this concept in particular disciplinary domains or contexts: disability studies, ethnography, and postcolonial studies (broadly conceived). Laura Davy's essay, "Between an Ethic of Care and an Ethic of Autonomy: Negotiating Relational Autonomy, Disability, and Dependency," turns to the role that relationality plays in disability drichel studies and introduces the idea of a "relational autonomy" in an effort to "reconcile an understanding of our constitutive relationality with a respect for individuality." She focuses on the field of disability studies as the terrain where the tension between dependency and autonomy is particularly pronounced and where our cultural myth of individual autonomy renders people with disabilities as inadequate or deficient: "Disability represents dependency and loss of control in a cultural context that privileges independence and self-mastery." She argues that in such a cultural context, intellectual disability is seen as "the ultimate personal tragedy: the mind that cannot govern itself." Challenging this prevailing view, she mobilises a relational conception of subjectivity that normalises dependency and vulnerability as constitutive of who we are, reminding us, however, that recognition of relationality needs to be balanced with "respect for individual personhood"a balance that she sees achieved by the aspirational ideal of relational autonomy, where "autonomy cannot be enabled without care, and care cannot be enabling without respect for autonomy." Positioning intellectual disability as "an exemplum of relational autonomy in so far as a heightened need for support in communicating, making decisions, and other aspects of participating in daily life illustrates this concept visibly," she argues that the absence of disability often obscures the relational support all of us are in need of to be able to function autonomously and that the example of intellectual disability can therefore draw attention to a dynamic that is more broadly at play in our culture. Davy frames her article with two moving vignettes about her relationship with her intellectually disabled sister Millie, both of which are used to introduce key points in her argument. The first vignette illustrates how Millie, although non-verbal, has a clear way of communicating her needs and preferencesher agencyvia the shared language of song. Just like Millie has greater agency than hegemonic discourse of independence and selfsufficiency generally allows (thereby challenging us to "rethink social assumptions about the incompetency of people with intellectual disability to exercise autonomy"), the dependencies she displays "fall within a spectrum of dependency experienced by all human beings" (thereby illustrating that "independence is illusory"). The dependency/autonomy binary therefore collapses. Davy further argues that the persistent investment in ideals of independence invisibilises our ordinary dependency needs, which, in turn, means that the relations of care that are needed to support the autonomy of people with higher support needs are not given the wider social support that, in turn, is needed to make the support of their autonomy possible. The second vignetteabout a frightening week in hospital for Millie, during which Davy becomes the mouthpiece for her sister's experienceis introduced to make an argument for the importance of relational representation. Addressing frequent concerns that the representation of another's experience is tantamount to appropriation, Davy demonstrates the ways in which relational representationrepresentation by anothermay, at times, be the only way of representing an experience at all. As she writes, with reference to Millie, sometimes we are strangers to ourselves, as she was for those days in the hospital, and it is up to those close to us to hold our identities and ask for what we cannot, to read us and speak for us.
From reflections about relational autonomy in the context of disability studies, we move to a conversation between two researchers, Stephen Frosh and Ruth Sheldon, who are engaged in an ethnography on an orthodox Jewish community in London. Their article, "Transmission, Relationality, Ethnography," engages the theme of relationality in multiple ways and modalities, positioning at its heart the rich and layered e-mail correspondence that unfolds between them around not just their respective experiences with the project but also, and importantly, with each other as they move through these experiences in the research process. Aligning their methodology with the broad header of "reflexivity," they propose that "attending closely to what happens between members of a research team editorial introduction can provide powerful insights into the substantive content of the research itself." Importantly, rather than being "confessional" or "auto-ethnographic," this reflexivity is persistently directed towards the research itself, so that the subjectivities of the researchers and their relational entanglements with each other and with their research are all directed towards advancing the project. As they argue, with reference to Ruth Behar, "The point is that reflecting on the relationality of the research process needs to do something that advances the research itself." The correspondence that emerges between them (which has been edited for publication) is, as they say, "deeply bound up with overlapping themes of Jewish identities, gender, generational difference, the 'violence' of exclusion and inclusion, transmission, and vulnerability," and they note that these "are also, not at all coincidentally, themes that are central to the ethnography itself." Taking this "non-coincidence" as a starting point, they state that the aim of their paper is "to explore the nature of this epistemological connection between our interpersonal or intersubjective process and our research findings." As the correspondence unfolds, we are invited simultaneously into the troubled and troubling world of the orthodox Jewish community that Ruth researchesshe identifies the "precarious situation of this community" (due to a dwindling membership), as well as its problematic gender dynamicsand into Ruth's own personal and highly ambivalent investment in this community, an investment which is further extendedvia emotionally charged father/daughter transferencesto the evolving relationship between Ruth and Stephen. At the heart of this complex and multi-layered relational dynamic lie questions of cultural rupture and continuity, "tradition" and intimacy, intergenerational transmission of trauma, and, perhaps above all, questions about the ways in which the relationship between fathers and daughters might come to function as bonds of cultural transmission rather than traumatic rupture. Deeply affected by her own family history, in which an orthodox synagogue's practice of gender segregation had led to Ruth's mother's sudden loss of precious intimacy with her father, resulting in her breaking away from all things Jewisha rupture and loss acutely felt by Ruth -Ruth's anger is palpable when she asks, "what intergenerational possibilities are there for a father and daughter? If we daughters cannot be part of a minyan [the quorum of ten men required for a prayer gathering], then how can these relations sustain forms of transmission?" Demonstrating the multidimensionality of the relationality at work here, these are questions that fire in all of the relational directions that are at play in this article: they are directed at Ruth's own desire for establishing "intergenerational continuity" in the place of rupture, at the community she researcheswhich perpetuates such ruptures and thereby risks advancing its own demiseand at her relationship with Stephen, whom she effectively interpellates into the role of guarantor of such intergenerational continuity. The relationship between researchers is therefore crucial for the way the research unfolds: "reflecting on this very personal struggle with questions of transmission in the research relationship," they argue, opens up a set of research questions that might otherwise not be easily perceived and yet are core to the Jewish communities that are the object of the research study: how do we survive, how do we create a future in the face of what we experience from the past? If there is a break in the line of tradition, what new connections can be made that provide regenerative (new generation) cultural experiences?
Crucially, it is also the relationship between the researchers that might indeed forge those "new connections," so that repair may be found residing not so much in the attempt to re-learn a tradition through transmission of a cultural practice but rather in finding ways to allow for the mutual expression of a daughter's anger and the uncertainties, shame, and inner conflicts of an orthodox fatherin other words, of forging connections between generations who are pulled by competing, in some sense impossible, demands.
drichel With the final three essays, we are moving, broadly speaking, into the terrain of decolonisation and postcolonial relationality (and its various failures and possibilities). Joanne Faulkner's essay, "Settler-Colonialism's 'Miscarriage': Thinking the Failure of Relationality through Irigaray's 'Interval,'" sets the scene by characterising the failure of postcolonial relationality as one where cultural difference is not thought as such but rather approached in terms of an assimilationist reduction of one term (the colonised) to the other (the coloniser). Focusing on the situation of settler-colonial Australia, she argues that it is precisely because such assimilationist paradigms continue to structure the relationship between First-Nations Australians and settler-Australians that their relationality has "miscarried" and not produced an equal exchange across difference. In an effort to conceive of a more enabling form of relationality one that is "conceived as a living, changing 'interval' that is shared and maintained by each" -Faulkner turns to the resources offered by feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Quick to acknowledge that Irigaray is not an altogether unproblematic resource in a postcolonial contexther privileging of sexual difference leaves her under-attuned to the workings of cultural difference -Faulkner argues that, nonetheless, "her effort to theorise structures of difference may be useful to an analysis of the colonial situation in Australia (and perhaps other settler-colonial states), particularly where she proposes what she variously calls the 'interval,' 'intermediary,' or 'third term.'" For Faulkner, it is in these concepts that "the most persuasive element of her critique for thinking colonial difference" can be found. What is enabling about such intermediation between two terms is that the intermediary functions as "a third term that both allows an exchange to take place between two and maintains the difference between them, thus enabling change and growth to take place." To collapse such intermediation (in the way that Hegel's sublation and synthesis do, for example) is to lose the change and growth that are proper to relationality. As Faulkner argues, the "capacity to encounter others without reducing them to an aspect of oneself requires a third term or interval," and she finds, in Irigaray's work, three modalities through which such intermediation can potentially happen: love, the placenta, and wonder. The first, she says, stands at risk of being derailed by the teleological investment in reproduction; love here "becomes a means to the goal of species reproduction rather than enabling connection and separation between lovers." The placenta seems more promising as an intermediary, for it "forms a relation between two separate beings who would otherwise destroy each other through absorption or infection." What is important here is that "this organ is not a point of fusion between mother and child." Unlike the child as embodied or materialised third term, the placenta therefore "remains, in its being, an intermediary. It enables a separate existence for each, whilst keeping them connected." Wonder, as conceptualised by Descartes, looks similarly promising, for it is "the passion that attends the encounter with entities that are truly different and surprising," and it is through wonder that "we come to comprehend an experience of otherness as irreducibility to the self." In the final part of her essay, Faulkner turns to the situation of settler-colonial Australia and its "miscarried" relationality, a miscarriage which has resulted in reducing indigenous Australians' "difference" to a negative inflection of white settler superiority. She argues that, Before the one-sidedness of this relation has been addressed, there cannot be "reconciliation" or celebration of the relatedness of each to the other on equal terms. A new form of intermediation must take place, generated in the historical and material distinctiveness of that interval and through a shared effort not to reduce the other to a resource for self-representation.
Irigaray's figure of the intermediary "may help us to reimagine postcolonial relations," she proposes, and indigenous activismincluding theatre, political protest, and demands for a treaty -"could constitute such a third term" if it is met with "appropriate responsiveness on the colonisers' part."
Changing tack both theoretically and geographically, John Drabinski's essay "Sites of Relation and 'Tout-Monde': Reflections on Glissant's Late Work" turns to "one of contemporary theory's great Deleuzians"a "Deleuzian," however, who adopts Deleuzian motifs in such a thoroughly creolised way as not to fall victim to "simple forms of colonisation of thought." At the centre of Drabinski's discussion stands Glissant's later work, particularly his 2010 anthology of poetry La Terre, le feu, l'eau, et les vents: poeśie du tout-monde, which Drabinski positions as the culmination of a number of strandsan "aesthetics of chaos," an investment in relationality, and in futuritythat have informed and sustained Glissant's works through the decades. Thus, if "Globalised and globalising contact and transformation" marks "the signature of Glissant's later work," the preoccupation with what Drabinski calls "the fecundity of relationality" was already visible in Glissant's earlier engagement with "Relation." "Relation," Drabinski notes, "is a critical term in Glissant's oeuvre, naming a process in and through which meaning is made out of fragments rather than grown out of a rooted tradition." "Relation" refers specifically to the complex process of meaning-making in the Caribbeanfor Glissant "the crossroads of the world"after the Middle Passage. As Drabinski writes, "Relation names the culture work at and inside that meeting space. It is a tortured geography but also home, place, and site of deep belonging." In fact, it is Glissant's treatment of the Middle Passage as a philosophical event that designates, for Drabinski, "one of Glissant's signature contributions to thinking": Nothing is the same after. Roots are lost, new roots are set, and the task for the theorist is how to appreciate the multiplicity of roots and the entanglements of relationality against compulsions to unify in the one and the single.
In this, Drabinski suggests, Glissant offers something fundamentally new and different from the work simultaneously undertaken by his peers: So much of postcolonial theory from the mid-century black Atlantic fled from this puzzle of fragmentation and multiplicity, turning instead to models of unified culture and nation, whether the racial origin (Neǵritude in Ceśaire and Senghor) or the radically new born out of revolutionary struggle and its severing of ties to the past (Fanon).
Glissant's work, by contrast, invests in "Creolised cultural forms and composite senses of identity. All of that set in motion. No notion of dialectics, search for origins, or breaks with the past can account for what has already been made." What seems crucial here is Glissant's radical investment in futurity: a futurity produced by the tangles of past and present cultural encounters, or what Glissant calls "a prophetic vision of the past." Drabinski comments that, in this prophetic vision of the past, Glissant "is able to reconceptualise the history of atrocity as a history of open systemsthe Plantation, a putatively closed system, turns out to have been a space of mixture and creation." In other words: a history of pain here takes on another register, which is oriented towards creation and "the possibilities for another, postcolonial future." In his later work, exemplified by the curatorial practice under display in La Terre, le feu, l'eau, et les vents: poeśie du tout-monde, Glissant expands his thinking on "Relation" and comes to think of it as a "worldly/global form of transformation." With this "shift from a poetics of Relation to a poetics of tout-monde," Glissant creates, Drabinski suggests, a "poetics of the whole world": "Tout-monde names an aggressive, futureoriented imperative to put global cultures in contact and to draw on the productive chaos that comes from that contact."
The concluding essay, Claire Colebrook's "A Cut in Relationality: Art at the End of the World," marks a radical departure from the other contributions assembled here in that it addresses not just the "end of the world" but also the "end of relationality." Significantlyand it is here that her essay departs so radically drichel from the other contributions to the special issue and their endowment of relationality with ethical, political, and/or creative potentialsuch an end of relationality is to be embraced rather than lamented, for Colebrook considers an all-encompassing relationality to be the problem, not the solution, to ethical functioning. The first half of her essay documents what, for her, is a problematic "privileging of relationality" vis-à-vis three conceptsthe Anthropocene, the polity, and the art galleryall of which demonstrate a movement towards an everexpanding inclusiveness that Colebrook wants to challenge. Thus she argues, "Understanding the way in which these terms are intertwined allows us to rethink the prima facie value accorded to relationality," where, when "we think about 'the end of the world,' we rarely think about the end of the planet or even the mass extinctions heading our way," but instead are preoccupied with fears about "the end of social fabric, of the forms of globalism and connection that have allowed the world to be figured as one interwoven, self-reflexive, and dynamic whole." As she argues with reference to a broad range of thinkers (including Michel Foucault, Bernard Stiegler, and Gilles Deleuze), what all three concepts demonstrate is the ways in which conceptions of the "good life" are persistently aligned with "a centripetal relationality." "What cannot be admitted as viable," she writes, "is a non-globalising mode of existence that does not rely on a conception of humanity in general." Seeking alternatives to such anthropocentrism and anthropocenism, her argument moves towards the thought of what she calls "a radical cut or refusal of relationality," and she is proposing that such a cut or refusalanother (welcome) version of "the end of the world" -"would come about through decolonisation." Asking "what might it mean to embrace the end of the world," she writes, Rather than each individual forming themselves in terms of one self-constituting humanity, ending the world would amount to an end of the forms of individuating colonisation that allow us to be human only in so far as we have an orientation to the world.
Decolonisation is therefore to be associated not with "the intensification of differences to the point where new thresholds are opened" but rather with "a mode of existence that does not begin with the fetishisation of relationality." She calls it "a new nomadism." Such new nomadism, she says, "is both the way the end of the world has been imagined and the way many humans have existed and the way we might imagine a future not bound up with a fetishised conception of global simultaneity and relationality." In illustration of the latter she turns to two artists, writer Octavia Butler and visual artist Beatriz Cortez, whose works offer the kind of "dispersed simultaneity" that cuts into relationalityand does so, she proposes, "both for the sake of ending the world and to demonstrate that a world without relationality is a possibility for multiple worlds."
Completing the special issue are ten interspersed poems by contemporary New Zealand poet Lynley Edmeades. Edmeades' poems separate and connectrelatethe scholarly contributions, and do so in a way that both responds to themes and arguments advanced by the authors and sets its own impulses for imagining the work of relationality; I am immensely grateful to her for making this poetic work available for inclusion in the special issue. As well as Edmeades, I would like to thank all authors for trusting me with their work and for their patience with my numerous requests for revision. For their financial support of this special issue, I would like to thank the Department of English & Linguistics at the University of Otago and Lisa Marr foronce againdoing a superb job with the copy-editing and formatting. A big thank you also to the team at Angelaki -Gerard Greenway, Charlie Blake, and James Hypherfor warmly accepting this project for publication and helping it along with unceasing patience, interest, and commitment. And finally, on behalf of the authors and me as editor, a really big thank you to the unsung heroes behind any scholarly publication: the anonymous peer-reviewers. No editing project could succeed without dozens of people giving countless hours of their time for very little reward other than, if they are lucky, to editorial introduction see a contribution grow into the best-possible version of itself -I hope they will find pleasure and satisfaction in what they have helped create here. notes 1 Loneliness researchers John T. Cacioppo and William Patrick observe, for example, that "social isolation has an impact on health comparable to the effect of high blood pressure, lack of exercise, obesity, or smoking" (5). tively focusing on a "we" that "truly encompasses all of humanity" (6), for example, sits uneasily with me. Relationality, as a number of the contributors to this special issue indicate, must be conceived more broadly than simply as the relationships among humans. 5 The second sense of "dispossession," by contrast, is less enabling: "in the second sense dispossession implies imposed injuries, painful interpellations, occlusions, and foreclosures, modes of subjugation that call to be addressed and redressed" (2). 6 Butler at one point notes that prior to being able to be an "I," I am necessarily "a being who has been touched, moved, fed, changed, put to sleep" (Giving an Account 70). 7 A fuller consideration of this questionwhich animates most of my recent workwill have to wait for another occasion. I have addressed aspects of it in "Refusals of Responsibility," an essay that reflects on what might get in the way of our inherent relationaland ethicalcapacity, or what might see us refuse the responsibility we are assigned through the process of what Levinas calls "substitution."
